Certain federal criminal laws require the mens rea of “corruptly.” However, the Supreme Court has not clearly defined this state of mind in two cases.
28 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), the statute in question in Fischer v. United States, states:
(c) Whoever corruptly—
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
The interpretation of (c)(2) in Fischer revolved around whether it was limited by (c)(1). The majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts concluded that (c)(1) did limit (c)(2), while Justice Barrett’s dissent disagreed. Justice Jackson, unexpectedly, sided with the majority but expressed a different view in a separate concurrence.
The term “corruptly” is crucial in Section 1512(c). However, its meaning remains unclear as the government did not provide a specific definition in the statute. Chief Justice Roberts pointed out the ambiguity surrounding the term “corruptly” in the statute.
The Government admits that Congress did not define ‘corruptly’ for purposes of Section 1512. While suggesting that ‘corruptly’ is normally associated with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil conduct, it fails to explain how ‘knowingly us[ing] intimidation’ or ‘threat[s]’ against someone is not ‘wrongful.’
The challenge lies in defining “corruptly” beyond simply “wrongful.” The term must reflect the state of mind of the defendant when committing the acts listed in 1512. The debate on the meaning of “corruptly” continues, with various Justices offering different interpretations.
Judge Walker’s definition of “corruptly” as requiring an intent to procure an unlawful benefit resonates with the idea of self-enrichment. This definition suggests that the term implies some form of personal gain from the corrupt act.
The uncertainty surrounding the term “corruptly” raises concerns about the broad application of Section 1512(c)(2). Chief Justice Roberts highlighted the potential threat of charging activists and lobbyists with decades in prison under this provision. Justice Barrett, in her dissent, argued for a screening mechanism to prevent innocent individuals engaging in lawful activities from being prosecuted under a broad interpretation of “corruptly.”
The ongoing debate over the interpretation of “corruptly” reflects the complexity of statutory language and its implications on criminal proceedings.
In summary, when challenging the constitutionality of a statute based on the First or Second Amendment in a motion to dismiss a criminal indictment, a defendant can only raise a facial challenge. This differs from challenges based on enumerated powers, as seen in the Lopez case. Therefore, the Salerno standard applies, requiring the defendant to demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional in all aspects. While the overbreadth doctrine may still apply, an as-applied challenge is not permitted in a motion to dismiss an indictment. If Justice Barrett believes that an as-applied challenge is viable for a First Amendment claim, she may need to reconsider the Rahimi case.
In the Snyder v. United States case, the Court examined the distinction between bribery and gratuity, particularly focusing on the term “corruptly.” Justice Jackson’s dissent highlighted the relevance of “consciousness of wrongdoing,” suggesting a connection to a “knowing” mental state. Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion clarified that bribes involve payments made before an official act to influence that act, inherently considered corrupt. The key factor in determining corruption is the exchange of an official act for personal gain.
During the first Trump impeachment, it was emphasized that distinguishing between a government official’s personal benefit and a public benefit is crucial. When one official performs a public act in exchange for another official’s public act, it is not considered bribery or corruption but rather political compromise. Criminalizing such acts would amount to criminalizing politics.
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