The article can be accessed here; the following is the Introduction:
State-sponsored disinformation (SSD) aimed at other nations’ populations is a tactic that has been utilized for centuries. However, SSD powered by internet social media presents a more potent tool than previously recognized by the U.S. government. This form of disinformation can sow distrust in government, incite societal discord—sometimes leading to violence, hinder national unity, exacerbate existing political and social divides, and prompt individuals to take disruptive actions in the real world.
Recognizing the impact of SSD, various stakeholders including legislators, government officials, corporate leaders, media personalities, and academics have initiated discussions on potential strategies to mitigate the harmful effects of internet disinformation. While several proposed solutions pose technical or practical challenges, the primary concern lies in the potential infringement on the First Amendment’s protection of free speech and expression. Notably, foreign powers do not enjoy First Amendment rights. Hence, in accordance with the Constitution, the U.S. government can intervene against SSD provided it can unequivocally attribute the dissemination to a state actor. To what extent can the government combat SSD within constitutional bounds? Are novel legal provisions necessary?
The federal government possesses numerous legal mechanisms to restrict activities within the U.S. orchestrated by adversarial nations. Some of these tools have been recently deployed to counter hostile powers’ nefarious “influence operations,” including internet-driven disinformation. Nevertheless, several nations persist in their SSD efforts. Russia, in particular, conducts a sophisticated campaign targeting America’s vulnerabilities, potentially exacerbating internal divisions, influencing public policy adversely, and inciting violence.
Russia has disseminated or amplified disinformation targeting U.S. audiences on varied subjects such as U.S. presidential candidates’ character, vaccine effectiveness, Martin Luther King Jr., international peace treaty legitimacy, and other topics ranging from plausible to fantastical. While these topics and social media messages may appear absurd to many Americans, they resonate with a subset of the population—potentially impacting outcomes. Russian SSD likely played a substantial role in events like the UK’s Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. However, measures to counter such disinformation risk impinging on citizens’ constitutional rights.
The effectiveness of internet-propagated disinformation from foreign adversaries, used as part of “influence operations” or “hybrid warfare,” is bolstered by the covert nature of the foreign involvement, the gradual and subtle harm caused by foreign operations, and the predominant presence of seemingly self-motivated American actors. Historically, accusations of “foreign affiliations” have been wielded to justify suppressing dissent against government actions abroad. Hence, governmental responses to SSD, like regulating social media content, must be vigilantly monitored to prevent abuse and must target the state sponsor rather than unwitting or complicit citizens.
The regulation of social media by the government poses challenges in defining criteria for banning content and necessitates interpretation during enforcement. An alternative approach could involve the government publicly identifying the foreign origins and perpetrators of malicious SSD, sharing this information with social media platforms, and urging them to restrict or flag such content. An independent organization endorsed by social media platforms could expedite the review of government requests and offer recommendations. Granting the government regulatory power to censor social media posts—excluding those explicitly promoting criminal activities like child exploitation, drug trafficking, or human smuggling—might pave the way for future abuses by politically motivated regulators.
