Commentary
Under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping, the United Front Work Department (UFWD) has significantly expanded its reach and sophistication. This expansion poses a growing challenge to the United States and other Western nations in safeguarding their democratic processes, freedom of speech, and national security.
A recent decision by a Special Immigration Appeals Commission tribunal upheld the Home Office’s 2023 ruling to prohibit Chris Yang (also known as Yang Tengbo) from entering the United Kingdom on suspicion of espionage and connections to the CCP. Yang is allegedly affiliated with the UFWD, an entity that promotes Beijing’s interests through foreign influence operations. His activities reportedly involve cultivating relationships with prominent figures like Prince Andrew and facilitating interactions between UK businesses and Chinese officials.
Referred to as a “magic weapon” by Xi and former CCP leader Mao Zedong, the UFWD’s primary objective is to shape global perceptions of China, suppress dissent, and advance Beijing’s political agenda. Operating under the CCP Central Committee, the UFWD employs various strategies, including influencing Chinese diaspora communities, engaging with foreign politicians, financing cultural organizations, and controlling media outlets. These activities often blur the line between cultural diplomacy and espionage, utilizing affiliated groups like the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification and Chinese Students and Scholars Associations.
Under Xi’s leadership, the UFWD has expanded its global operations to include funding Confucius Institutes, intimidating dissidents, and pressuring overseas Chinese to align with CCP policies. The department also targets ethnic minorities such as Tibetans and Uyghurs, engages in transnational repression, and manipulates foreign institutions to propagate Beijing’s global narrative. These efforts are integral to Xi’s broader vision of national rejuvenation and reunification with Taiwan.
Countries like the United States, Australia, and Canada have uncovered UFWD-linked activities involving political contributions, media investments, and recruitment within Western universities. The UFWD’s influence operations often masquerade as fostering cultural exchange while actually pursuing espionage and undermining democratic institutions.
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The UFWD’s operational capabilities are reinforced by China’s 2017 intelligence law, which mandates citizens and businesses to collaborate with state intelligence, blurring the lines and making all Chinese nationals potential informants. In Sweden, for example, the UFWD has established a clandestine network comprising at least 103 organizations across culture, business, politics, education, and media. These groups seek to enhance connections with the People’s Republic of China while subtly advancing the CCP’s strategic goals.
In the United States, the UFWD circumvents federal scrutiny by utilizing entities like the Chinese embassy, consulates, and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries to develop relationships with state and local governments, businesses, and academic institutions. State-owned media outlets such as China Daily amplify pro-Beijing messaging by strategically placing content in major U.S. publications. Organizations like the China General Chamber of Commerce leverage Chinese state-owned enterprises to promote Beijing’s economic interests and influence policy. Framed as economic and cultural exchanges, UFWD initiatives, including sister-city partnerships, economic forums, and research projects, align subnational actors in the U.S. with the CCP’s strategic objectives and shape narratives supportive of its geopolitical ambitions.
The CCP exploits the lenient laws and policies of Western nations, including the United States, the UK, and Australia, to enhance its influence. In response, countries have introduced measures like foreign interference laws to combat UFWD activities. However, these efforts have been criticized for potentially leading to racial profiling of ethnic Chinese communities. Some caution that overly aggressive responses could alienate diaspora communities and play into Beijing’s propaganda, complicating efforts to address legitimate security concerns. Western nations face the challenge of countering these threats without resorting to measures perceived as discriminatory.
The UK is set to implement a Foreign Influence Registration Scheme in 2025, mandating individuals acting on behalf of foreign powers to disclose their activities. However, debates continue on whether China should be categorized in an “enhanced tier,” broadening the range of activities necessitating registration.
Calls to designate China as a national security threat have intensified in the UK, but officials proceed cautiously, mindful of potential impacts on crucial trade relations. Financial institutions like HSBC have also warned that stricter measures could harm business interests.
In the United States, the U.S. Intelligence Community identifies the Chinese regime as the most significant national security threat. The Department of Homeland Security highlights the regime’s involvement in economic and cyber threats, as well as its complicity in the fentanyl crisis through the supply of precursor chemicals to Mexican cartels.
Western governments, particularly the United States, acknowledge the CCP as a substantial national security threat. However, their liberal policies often constrain their responses due to concerns about offending Chinese diaspora communities, accusations of racial profiling, or potential harm to trade and investment relationships. The CCP exploits these limitations to sustain its covert operations while utilizing media and social platforms to disseminate a narrative discrediting espionage allegations as baseless and rooted in racism.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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