[A.] The Pennsylvania Supreme Court majority opinion in Oberholzer v. Galapo, authored by Justice Kevin Dougherty and supported by Chief Justice Debra Todd and Justices Christine Donohue and Sallie Updyke Mundy, recounts a dispute between neighbors that escalated due to offensive remarks. The Galapo family responded by posting anti-hate and anti-racist signs on their property, leading to a lawsuit filed by the Oberholzer family.
The Oberholzers alleged that the signs constituted various legal violations, including private nuisance, intrusion upon seclusion, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court ordered the Galapos to reposition the signs so they were not directly facing the Oberholzers’ property. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that this injunction infringed upon the Galapos’ free speech rights under the state constitution, citing a precedent that prohibits injunctions against speech.
The majority opinion emphasized the importance of free communication of thoughts and opinions, especially in the context of peaceful protest. It also noted that the speech in question related to matters of public concern, such as hate and discrimination. The Court concluded that the signs did not infringe on the Oberholzers’ privacy in a significant enough manner to warrant censorship.
Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that modifying the signs to be less visible would be a valid compromise, stating that such action would still impede the Galapos’ right to direct their message towards their intended audience. The dissenting opinion by Justice Kevin Brobson argued for the constitutionality of content-neutral injunctions to address private nuisances caused by residential speech.
[1.]
Instead, the Galapos erected the signs in their back yard and directed them strictly toward the Oberholzers—i.e., one private home—while placing zero signs in their front yard for the public to see. Additionally, if the Galapos intended to reach a broader audience with the signs, there would be no need for the Galapos to appeal from the trial court’s order entering the Injunction because, under the Injunction’s limitations, the signs were still visible to the neighbors, just not the Oberholzers. The nail in the coffin that cements these points is Dr. Galapo’s testimony that it was irrelevant whether anyone other than the Oberholzers saw the signs. Thus, the foregoing makes clear that the Galapos’ signs were targeted speech designed to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Oberholzers’ home….
[2.]
I fail to see how a severe and negative impact upon the well-being, tranquility, and quiet enjoyment of the Oberholzers’ home is insufficient to warrant injunctive relief. Surely, the quiet enjoyment of the home is a “substantial privacy interest.” The Majority also offers no explanation for how a severe and negative impact on that interest has any meaningful distinction from an “intolerable invasion” of privacy.
[C.] Justice David Wecht dissented as well, also in a long opinion. A few excerpts:
[1.]
I conclude ultimately that the injunction here is not a prior restraint and does not violate the no-injunction rule, a rule that in any event does not exist in Pennsylvania, and one that would not apply to this case even if it did exist here. Contrary to the Majority’s analysis, equity courts possess the authority to issue certain kinds of narrow injunctions that restrict speech so long as those injunctions can withstand either intermediate scrutiny (for content-neutral injunctions) or strict scrutiny (for content-based injunctions). Because the instant injunction survives application of either standard, it should be upheld.
[2.]
At the heart of the prior restraint doctrine is the idea that “a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law [rather] than to throttle them and all others beforehand.” Narrowly tailored permanent injunctions do not throttle speakers before they break the law. Rather, they threaten subsequent punishment for repeat lawbreaking.
[3.]
[T]he injunction here also is extremely narrowly tailored to remedy the nuisance without burdening any more of the Galapos’ speech than is absolutely necessary. The injunction does not prevent the Galapos from expressing—to the Oberholzers or to anyone else—any of the messages that appear on any of the twenty-three signs. The injunction merely prohibits the Galapos from expressing those views in the exact manner that they had been employing—i.e., the tortious manner, which consisted of a years-long performance involving a rotating assortment of nearly two dozen signs placed along the property line so that they would be visible from inside the Oberholzers’ home.
Even with the injunction in place, the Galapos remain free to communicate the messages featured on their signs to the Oberholzers in any other way that they please. They can move the signs to their front yard. They can hang fliers on telephone poles in the neighborhood. They can place bumper stickers on their cars. They can post the messages on a social media application for neighbors. They could even stand on the sidewalk in front of the Oberholzers’ home holding the signs. I could go on. The critical point here is that the present injunction is laser-targeted to remedy the nuisance while preserving the Galapos’ right to express their thoughts and ideas in a non-tortious manner….
Furthermore, even assuming that the Majority is correct that the Galapos’ aim here was at least partially to educate the “local community” on “the consequences of hatred and racism,” … [t]he injunction has no impact at all on the Galapos’ freedom to speak to the community about anti-Jewish hatred in any of the usual ways that many of us do [citing several articles about anti-Semitism, including by Justice Wecht himself].
