Summary of Seventh Circuit opinion in Doe v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., authored by Judge Frank Easterbrook and joined by Judges Kenneth Ripple and Diane Wood:
John Doe, a medical student at Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis, had a relationship with fellow student Jane Roe, who accused him of physical abuse. After being found culpable by the Office of Student Conduct, Doe was suspended for one year with conditions for return. Despite a recommendation for expulsion by the Student Promotions Committee, Dean Jay Hess rejected the decision. When Doe applied to the MBA program at the Kelley School of Business, an investigation led to his expulsion from the medical school for allegedly withholding information. This expulsion prompted a lawsuit alleging violations of the Due Process Clause and Title IX.
Details omitted for brevity (full details here), focusing on the analysis of pseudonymity:
In federal litigation, parties’ names are typically public. Anonymity exceptions exist for minors under Rule 5.2(a)(3). Despite Doe’s adulthood during the events, the court considers whether a substantial risk justifies anonymity beyond avoiding embarrassment. Doe’s interest in reputation protection, despite the University’s findings, does not meet this standard.
Analogy is drawn to criminal charges and civil suits where defendants’ names are public despite potential reputational harm. The court questions the one-sided nature of shielding plaintiff identities while exposing defendants. The discretion to allow pseudonymous litigation is discussed, critiquing the magistrate judge’s factors and reasoning for granting anonymity in this case.
The confidence of a reviewing court in the careful and demanding balancing of interests by the district court is crucial in making determinations. However, in this case, such confidence cannot be maintained.
During oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit supplemental briefs regarding the issue of anonymity. Defendants argued for the disclosure of Doe’s name, while Doe argued against it. The submission highlighted the common practice of plaintiffs in Title IX cases concealing their identities, but simply following tradition is not a valid reason for doing so. It reflects more on the tactics used by plaintiffs’ lawyers rather than legal entitlements.
Neither Doe nor the district court referenced 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b), which restricts the release of educational records by institutions receiving federal funds under specific circumstances. The statute does not directly apply in this situation as Doe is not an educational institution and can disclose his own records. The question of whether this statute may limit public access to student identities, and how it applies to nonparties like Roe versus litigants like Doe, was not explored.
The district judge erred in allowing “John Doe” to conceal his name without establishing that he is a minor, facing physical harm, or encountering improper retaliation. Title IX litigation does not exempt adult litigants from being identified by name.
While it is not necessary to immediately reveal the real name in the public record, the magistrate judge’s ex parte order granting secrecy in this case was deemed an abuse of discretion. Doe now has the option to dismiss the suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). If the suit continues, Doe must disclose his true name, and the district court must address Dean Hess’s failure to provide Doe with an opportunity to present his case before expulsion. If Doe chooses not to disclose his name, the complaint will be dismissed.
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. For additional insights and references to cases with varying perspectives on pseudonymous litigation, refer to “The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation.”
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