It may come as a shock to many Australians to discover the presence of foreign spies in their country, but it is a harsh reality that must be acknowledged.
Commentary
The recent disclosure by a former Chinese operative regarding the existence of around 1,200 spies working for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Australia is not entirely surprising, especially for those familiar with the local Chinese community.
During a Defending Australia conference in Canberra, the former CCP spy, known as “Eric,” highlighted the different categories of espionage collaborators.
First Category: CCP Officials
The initial group consists of CCP employees, particularly diplomatic officials whose activities are clearly aligned with Beijing’s interests.
For instance, it was recently revealed that the Chinese consul in New South Wales sent an email to 11 MPs criticizing them for attending an event commemorating the inauguration of Taiwan’s new president, Lai Ching-Te.
When the contents of the email became public, the Chinese officials reacted defensively, seemingly justifying their aggressive communication as acceptable diplomatic behavior.
CCP diplomats have no authority to dictate the attendance of Australian MPs—both state and federal—at events, as implied in the email.
Although this form of interference in Australian affairs is overt, there are more clandestine activities taking place.
Second Category: Professional CCP Agents
More concerning is the covert involvement of known consular officials and other operatives in Australian affairs.
These activities include constant surveillance of Chinese students in universities and other academic institutions.
Such actions are not limited to Australia but extend globally, as evidenced by reports of Chinese nationals being monitored at universities in Germany and the prosecution of individuals connected to MPs in the UK for spying-related offenses.
In addition to surveillance, Chinese consular officials have been known to organize and support student protests and demonstrations.
Overseas Chinese students in Australia are increasingly aware that their actions and words are being closely monitored.
According to “Eric,” there are approximately 200 professional operatives operating in Australia, some linked to the Beijing government while others are affiliated with provincial authorities, working under various covers, including within the business sector.
Third Category: Spies In The Diaspora Community
Another level of surveillance involves pro-Beijing individuals within the Australian Chinese diaspora community. As a parliament member representing a constituency with a significant Chinese population, I often received reports of CCP agents operating locally.
An evident example of this was the recent conviction of a diaspora member attempting to unlawfully influence a federal MP.
These activities, orchestrated by Beijing’s United Front Work Department and associated organizations, have been ongoing for years.
Academics like Clive Hamilton and Mareike Olhberg have shed light on the extent of CCP influence and surveillance through their works like “Silent Invasion” and “Hidden Hand.”
Regime leader Xi Jinping has described the United Front as a crucial component of the CCP government.
Potential for More Spies
Considering the sizable Chinese diaspora in Australia and the numerous electorates with significant Chinese populations, the reported 1,200 CCP-linked spies and collaborators may seem surprisingly low.
Aside from “Eric’s” recent revelations, the head of Australia’s domestic security agency ASIO has repeatedly raised concerns about foreign espionage activities.
In recent assessments, ASIO’s director Mike Burgess has highlighted the threat of domestic terrorism as the agency’s primary focus, although foreign surveillance remains a significant concern, especially given current global events.
Despite the shifting priorities, the threat of foreign spying in Australia persists, necessitating continued vigilance and proactive measures.
Eric’s testimony serves as a stark reminder of the persistent risks we face, coupled with escalating cyber threats from Beijing against Western nations, including Australia.
Awareness of the presence of foreign operatives is crucial for addressing this issue, along with ensuring that our security agencies are well-equipped to counter these activities effectively.
It is imperative that the heads of ASIO and ASIS regain full membership on the National Security Committee, a step that the government should promptly take to safeguard our national security interests.
Ignoring the ongoing threat posed by CCP’s multifaceted approach towards the West is not an option, and proactive measures must be implemented to safeguard Australia’s freedom and democracy.
Opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and may not reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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