Commentary
How China’s Control of Undersea Cables and Data Flows Reshapes Global Power
Cable Routing Protocols
The rapid construction of undersea cables has brought a hidden but crucial issue into focus: the manipulation of the protocols that control how data travels beneath the sea. These protocols determine the pathways internet data takes, influencing speed, costs, and even exposure to surveillance. Even small changes in these pathways can tilt the global balance of digital power. China’s increasing role in this area demonstrates how technology can be used strategically to reshape geopolitics.
At the heart of this issue is a technology called Software-Defined Networking (SDN). SDN allows data traffic to be managed and optimized in real time, improving efficiency. But this same flexibility makes SDN vulnerable to misuse. Chinese tech companies like HMN Tech (formerly Huawei Marine Networks), ZTE, and China Unicom are leading the way in SDN development. China also holds sway in international organizations that set the rules for these technologies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). This influence gives China a hand in shaping global standards and governance.
Africa illustrates how this influence plays out. Chinese investments in digital infrastructure across the continent are massive. For example, the PEACE (Pakistan and East Africa Connecting Europe) cable, which links East Africa to Europe, was designed to avoid Chinese territory. Yet, thanks to SDN technology, its traffic can still be redirected through Chinese-controlled points. This redirection could introduce delays of 20 to 30 milliseconds per hop—not much for casual browsing, but a serious issue for latency-sensitive activities like financial trading or encrypted communication.
In Southeast Asia, similar risks are evident. The Southeast Asia-Japan Cable (SJC), which connects Singapore to Japan, relies on several landing stations influenced by China. During a period of heightened tensions in the South China Sea, some data intended for Japan was mysteriously routed through Hainan Island, under Chinese jurisdiction. Such cases suggest technical routing decisions may sometimes have political motivations.
These examples are part of a broader strategy. By exploiting SDN, China can turn submarine cables into tools for surveillance and control. Data traffic from Africa or Southeast Asia destined for Europe could be secretly rerouted through Shanghai or Guangzhou, exposing it to China’s advanced surveillance techniques like deep packet inspection. This threat extends to cloud computing, as major providers such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Alibaba Cloud rely on undersea cables. With SDN, Chinese cloud providers—aligned with state interests—could redirect sensitive inter-cloud traffic, putting critical communications at risk.
Manipulating global data routes gives any actor significant geopolitical power. For instance, in a crisis, China could degrade or even sever internet connectivity for rival nations. In the Taiwan Strait, this could isolate Taiwan from global markets, disrupting financial transactions and trade. In Africa, where Huawei has built a significant portion of the continent’s telecommunications infrastructure—reportedly constructing around 70 percent of 4G networks—there is concern that this reliance could create vulnerabilities. If political tensions were to arise, China could cause slowdowns or disruptions to reinforce dependence, making countries more vulnerable in political standoffs.
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The numbers highlight the stakes. Submarine cables carry 99 percent of international data traffic—over 1.1 zettabytes annually. Significant portions of intra-Asia-Pacific data flows pass through key submarine cable landing stations, including Hong Kong, which is under Chinese jurisdiction. With Chinese firms increasingly involved in substantial global submarine cable projects—such as those undertaken by HMN Technologies—Beijing’s influence over the internet’s physical backbone is growing.
The economic impact of internet disruptions on highly connected economies is substantial. For instance, the NetBlocks Cost of Shutdown Tool (COST) estimates the economic impact of internet disruptions using indicators from the World Bank, ITU, Eurostat, and the U.S. Census. According to data presented by Atlas VPN, based on NetBlocks’ COST tool, a global internet shutdown for one day could result in losses of about $43 billion, with the United States and China accounting for nearly half of this sum. Additionally, Deloitte has estimated that for a highly internet-connected country, the per-day impact of a temporary internet shutdown would be on average $23.6 million per 10 million population.
A deliberate attack on routing protocols could cause widespread financial and operational chaos. In today’s interconnected world, where digital infrastructure underpins economic stability, the ability to manipulate undersea cable traffic represents a subtle but powerful geopolitical weapon.
Addressing this threat goes beyond simply building more cables. It requires rethinking how routing protocols are governed. Transparent global standards must ensure no single country or company can dominate these systems. Routine independent audits should be conducted to detect anomalies that may signal interference. Efforts like the European Union’s Global Gateway initiative and Japan’s Digital Partnership Fund must focus on creating alternative routes to reduce reliance on Chinese-controlled nodes.
This issue highlights a new reality in global politics: control over data flows is becoming a key form of power. While most attention has been on building physical infrastructure, the quiet manipulation of routing protocols marks an equally profound shift in global influence. To protect the integrity of the internet, the world must act decisively at both technical and governance levels.
Fiber-Optic Cable Repair Networks
China’s disproportionate control over fiber-optic cable repair networks reveals potential vectors for intelligence dominance, coercive leverage, and disruption of digital sovereignty. Globally, an estimated 60 dedicated cable repair ships service the planet’s 1.5 million kilometers of submarine cables. China controls a substantial percentage of the fleet, including ships operated by state-affiliated enterprises like Shanghai Salvage Company and China Communications Construction Group.
On the contrary, China has a significant fleet in the South and East China Seas, crucial regions for global connectivity due to chokepoints like the Singapore Strait and the Luzon Strait. China’s repair ships have easy access to monitor, repair, or potentially tamper with subsea cables, utilizing advanced technology like robotic submersibles and precision cutting-and-splicing tools that could be used for illegal interception. The lack of regulation in international frameworks like UNCLOS and weak enforcement mechanisms by organizations like ICPC leave the system vulnerable to exploitation by state actors like China.
China’s advancements in photonics, quantum communication technologies, and AI-driven data sorting tools allow them to exploit vulnerabilities in cable infrastructure, potentially intercepting sensitive traffic flow and cracking encrypted data. The lack of countermeasures by the U.S. and its allies, who rely on private operators with aging fleets, amplifies the risks posed by China’s dominance in this area.
To combat China’s strategic advantage, the U.S. and its allies must develop state-owned or state-subsidized repair fleets, enhance maritime surveillance systems, and revise international frameworks to include mandatory reporting of repair operations. Collaboration with regional partners like Australia, India, Japan, and the United States could strengthen collective maritime domain awareness and create redundancies in cable repair capabilities.
China’s use of automated vessel tracking systems, particularly the AIS, for economic intelligence gathering and military surveillance is a critical component of its global digital strategy. By aggregating AIS data from worldwide shipping lanes and integrating it with predictive analytics, China gains insights into global maritime chokepoints, strategic trade routes, and supply chain dynamics. This technology also plays a pivotal role in China’s military strategy, allowing them to track naval deployments with precision and anticipate U.S. Navy operations in the Indo-Pacific region.
Through its Digital Silk Road initiative, China exports AIS-enabled maritime technologies to enhance its access to regional maritime data and promote the adoption of its technologies abroad. This strategic use of AIS data gives China a significant advantage in monitoring global shipping patterns, optimizing resource flow, and positioning its assets for military operations. China’s investments in subsea mapping have given it a significant advantage in oceanographic intelligence, impacting various domains. The country’s efforts in mapping its maritime territories, strategic regions, and international initiatives have raised concerns over the dual-use potential of the data collected. China’s advanced capabilities in autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) have further enhanced its mapping abilities, allowing for detailed exploration critical for resource discovery and military operations.
The Chinese government has used seabed mapping as a diplomatic tool to extend its influence over smaller nations, often conducting mapping activities in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other countries. These activities have sometimes led to tensions and international criticism, highlighting concerns over the security implications of China’s maritime endeavors.
China’s control over seabed mapping data has also raised concerns about transparency and shared access in the global community. While international initiatives advocate for open sharing of ocean floor data, China has been criticized for not fully sharing the data it collects, limiting other nations’ ability to benefit from this valuable information.
Overall, China’s approach to subsea mapping data has significant implications for military operations, regional security, and global internet traffic. The lack of transparency in sharing this data contrasts with global norms promoting cooperation and transparency in oceanographic research. Please rewrite this sentence.
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