Commentary
The CAF, as it stands today, is a depleted, demoralized, and nearly shattered force. The neglect and deterioration, which I explored in Part I of this series, is unforgivable. But it’s not irreversible. How should Canada begin to rebuild the CAF?
A military is defined, in simplest terms, by five factors:
1. Purpose
The first step must be to define the CAF’s purpose. In my opinion, the purpose of the military must be apolitical, long-term, and incorporate broad-based capabilities that serve Canada’s national interests. The CAF’s purpose must not be shaped by political whims, media frenzies, or short-term missions. In basic terms, the CAF must be capable of helping to maintain Canada’s unity, national borders, democratic system, citizens’ rights and freedoms, economic prosperity, and citizens’ well-being. It needs to be a combat-capable force able to face all threats foreign and domestic.
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2. Combat-Capable Personnel
Canada’s armed forces have often been used as an “emergency management force” for wildfires and floods, as a “training force for other nations” and, most recently, as a social experiment laboratory of the latest transgender, DEI, and cultural concepts, a.k.a. “wokism.” All this comes at the expense of maintaining the CAF as combat-capable force.
Standing armed forces have one primary mission: to fight. Those who join the CAF understand that and know it may cost them their lives. In return, they expect to be fully trained and equipped. Canada’s troops must be trained to develop the full range of combat skills as well as the leadership skills needed to lead others under the most dangerous conditions. These must be constantly practised and improved to ensure they are up to date and executable on a moment’s notice.
3. Military Equipment
A combat-capable military requires warfighting weapons and weapons systems, from the high profile—ships and fighter jets—to the mundane—rifles, pistols, and even bayonets—to the sophisticated and leading-edge—drones, anti-tank missiles, and anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems. They must be procured in sufficient quantity and available constantly for training, demonstration (deterrence), and, ultimately, deployment and use.
4. Combat Capability Deployment and Support Systems
Napoleon Bonaparte stated, “The amateurs discuss tactics: the professionals discuss logistics.” The combat-capable CAF must be deployable wherever and whenever they are required. The deployment system must be thoroughly planned and routinely used or, during quieter periods, routinely exercised. Entities that pose a threat must see both a permanent geographically based presence (in every province and territory) as well as a surge capability that reaches internationally.
Canada has a long history of supporting large expeditionary forces across oceans during wartime; restoring such a capability is not an unreasonable expectation, nor beyond the resources of a country of 40+ million with a $3 trillion annual GDP.
5. Replacement Systems—Personnel, Equipment and Supplies
The military must have a reliable system to replace personnel, equipment, and supplies. For personnel, that means a recruitment system driven by a need to find those best prepared to meet the combat-related needs of the CAF, who can be trained in the shortest realistic time frame, and who will be most likely to make a career in the CAF. The replacement system for equipment must be proactive in replacing worn-out systems and equipment, with direct links to procurement systems that are timely and pre-established. It should be based on the CAF’s requirements rather than politics (this is, admittedly, much easier said than done).
With bold action, sustained investment, and a collective resolve, Canada can reclaim its place as a reliable ally and a defender of democratic values.
The expense of reconstructing the CAF is significantly surpassed by the cost of ongoing neglect.
David Redman served as a Canadian Army officer for 27 years, with deployments in various locations including Germany, Egypt, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, the United States, and Canada. He retired in 2001 and subsequently held positions as the head of Crisis Management-Counterterrorism in Alberta and later as the head of Emergency Management Alberta.
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of The Epoch Times.
